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Abstract 
Online social networks (OSNs) have gained great popularity in recent years, having 
become an integral part of our daily lives and an indispensable dimension of the 
Internet. Users worldwide spend a significant amount of their time on OSNs, which 
have enabled them to create new connections with others based on shared interests, 
activities, and ideas, as well as maintain connections from the past. 
Along with the positive aspects of OSNs, users are faced with some uniquely 
troublesome issues; chief among these issues are privacy and security. Security 
breaches often result when users write, share, and publish personal information about 
themselves, their friends, and their workplaces online, not realizing the information 
they post is available to the public and can be used to aid malicious hackers. 
Commonly shared personal information may include, but is not limited to personal 
photographs, date of birth, religious affiliations, personal interests, and political 
views. 
In our study, we attempted to emphasize the acute problems inherent on OSNs that 
leave both employees and organizations vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In many cases, 
these attacks include the use of socialbots, which among other things, can spread 
spam and malware, and “phish” for login and password information. These malicious 
attacks may result in identity theft, fraud, and loss of intellectual assets and 
confidential business information.  
 
The serious privacy and security problems related to OSNs are what fueled two 
complementary studies as part of this thesis. In the first study, we developed a general 
algorithm for the mining of data of targeted organizations by using Facebook 
(currently the most popular OSN) and socialbots. By friending employees in a 
targeted organization, our active socialbots were able to find new employees and 
informal organizational links that we could not find by crawling with passive 
socialbots. We evaluated our method on the Facebook OSN and were able to 
reconstruct the social networks of employees in three distinct, actual organizations. 
Furthermore, in the crawling process with our active socialbots we discovered up to 
13.55% more employees and 22.27% more informal organizational links in contrast to 
the crawling process that was performed by passive socialbots with no company 
associations as “friends”. 
 
In our second study, we developed a general algorithm for reaching specific OSN 
users who declared themselves to be employees of targeted organizations, using the 
topologies of organizational social networks and utilizing socialbots. We evaluated 
the proposed method on targeted users from three actual organizations on Facebook, 
and two actual organizations on the Xing OSN (another popular OSN platform). 
Eventually, our socialbots were able to reach specific users with a success rate of up 
to 70% on Facebook, and up to 60% on Xing.  
The results from both studies demonstrate the dangers associated with OSNs. We 
believe that raising awareness regarding privacy issues among all entities of OSNs — 
users, organizations, and OSN operators — as well as developing preventive tools and 
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policies, may help to resolve this widespread, critical situation, and better protect 
OSN users’ privacy and security. 
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1. Introduction 
For more than a decade, the Internet has played an increasingly major role in our 
lives. The Internet has amassed billions of users all over the world [1].  Users access 
the Internet by means of various digital devices such as computers, tablets, and 
smartphones for personal and business needs [2]. Moreover, the diversity of the 
activities users can carry out on the Internet platform is quite extensive. For example, 
they are able to surf the web and play games [3], purchase goods [4], schedule 
appointments, download files and software, pay bills, conduct meetings, and even 
read medical information [5]. 
One of the most successful sectors on the Internet that has gained great popularity in 
recent years is the platform of online social networks (OSNs) [6], [7]. Popular OSNs 
like Facebook,1 LinkedIn,2 MySpace,3 and Xing4 allow Internet users to create user 
accounts and maintain connections with others.  
The reasons for the growing popularity of OSNs are varied. One of the reasons is 
based on the fact that OSNs enable users to create new connections with others based 
on shared interests, activities, and ideas, etc., as well as providing a forum for 
maintaining connections from the past [6]. Other reasons are based on the fact that 
OSNs are multi-optional platforms for self-expression [8]. They provide a forum 
through which users can publish statuses and photos, play games, initiate romantic 
relationships, chat, and so on [9]. 
Along with the numerous benefits that OSNs provide —such, as maintaining 
relationships, finding new colleagues, and promoting businesses —there are also 
many threats that may jeopardize the security of OSN users, as well as that of their 
workplaces [10], [11].  
For example, today, many OSN users display the name of their workplace on their 
profile account [11], [12], [13], [14]. Malicious users may take advantage of this by 
recording such information for later use [15]. After gathering enough information 
regarding the employees of the targeted organization, they can use it to construct the 
organization’s structure [11]. After the reconnaissance process ends, they may utilize 
the sensitive information to perform malicious attacks on key-role employees. These 
attacks could result in fraud, as well as the loss of intellectual assets, and confidential 
business information for targeted organizations [14].   
In recent years, socialbot attacks were found to be preferred by several adversaries 
[1], [8], [12], [13], [14], [16]. Socialbots, which are also known as sybils [17], are 
defined as automatic or semi-automatic computer programs that control OSN 
                                                           
1 www.facebook.com 
2 www.linkedin.com 
3 www.myspace.com 
4 www.xing.com 
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accounts and perform human behaviors, such as sending friend requests and 
messages, etc. [1], [18]. 
This thesis is a combination of two complementary studies which are focused upon 
socialbot attacks. In the first study, we empirically measure the additional amount of 
information we could find on a targeted organization by using socialbots. In order to 
assess the amount of additional information, we developed a general algorithm for the 
mining of data of targeted organizations by using the Facebook OSN and socialbots 
(see Section 3.2.1). First, we crawled with a Facebook passive socialbot with no 
friends. The public information we gathered from this user was defined as the 
minimal public information that a user can gain within an OSN. Afterward, we 
crawled once again, but this time with a socialbot account that we created within the 
Facebook OSN. This socialbot befriended several employees in a targeted 
organization prior to the crawling process. By gaining the information regarding the 
connections and the role of these employees from the targeted organization, our 
socialbot was able to construct the organizational structure, as well as to find hidden 
connections and employees that we were not able to find by crawling with the passive 
socialbot. We evaluated our method on the Facebook OSN and were able to construct 
the social networks of three separate organizations.  Moreover, we discovered up to 
13.55% more employees and up to 22.27% more informal organizational connections 
during the crawling process using the active socialbots in contrast to the passive ones 
without any friends (see Section 4.1). An informal connection is defined as a social 
connection of individuals without formal structure. This connection is based often on 
friendship, ethnicity, neighborhood, etc. [19] 
In the second study, we continued our research by altering the study’s focus from a 
targeted organization to a targeted organization’s employees. We developed an 
algorithm for reaching specific OSN users who declared themselves to be employees 
of targeted organizations, by using topologies of organizational social networks, and 
socialbots (see Section 3.2.2). We evaluated the proposed method on targeted users 
from three actual organizations on Facebook, and two actual organizations on the 
Xing OSN. Eventually, our active socialbots were able to reach specific users with a 
success rate of 50%, 70% and 40% on Facebook, and 20%, and 60% on Xing (see 
Section 4.2).  
Lastly, we present suggestions and recommendations to prevent and detect socialbots 
from stealing great assets from targeted organizations and employees (see Section 7).  
Our results from both studies demonstrate that dangers within OSNs are prevalent. A 
user’s personal information may be disclosed to malicious third parties. Adversaries 
can use this information for reconnaissance and then to attack users on several 
platforms, such as within OSNs, in emails, etc. As a result, we believe that when 
using OSNs, users, organizations, and operators should be more careful and aware of 
the privacy issues. Furthermore, developing preventative tools, as well as restricting 
policies, may help to improve OSN users’ privacy and security. 
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1.1. Contributions 
This thesis was carried out in order to emphasize the serious threats that may be posed 
for organizations and employees in this time of the growing popularity of OSNs. 
Organizations and employees may find themselves in great danger on OSN platforms. 
Specifically, this thesis offers the following contributions: First, to the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to differentiate between public organizational information 
crawled by a passive socialbot with no friends, and crawling carried out by an active 
socialbot which gained several employees as friends in a targeted organization (see 
Section 4.1). Attaining such information awarded us the opportunity to extract a 
network of informal social relationships and to find new friendships and employees 
that we could not find before.      
Second, in contrast to several studies that discuss attempts to reach users through 
OSNs without making any distinction between them [1], [8], we chose to focus on 
employees in an organization to define as targets whom adversaries would be 
interested in infiltrating. 
 
Third, as opposed to similar studies that focused on reaching OSN users, this thesis 
also enhances the focus on organizations. Our studies were not defined as solely user-
oriented, but also as organization-oriented. We introduced the privacy issues within 
OSNs that threaten to endanger employees as well as organizations. 
 
Fourth, this study is the first to evaluate socialbot attacks on organizations in more 
than one OSN: Facebook, and Xing. 
Lastly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which offers a generic 
algorithm for reaching specific users within OSNs by means of socialbots. No other 
studies attempted to do this before.  
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1.2. Publications 
This thesis was a product of a fruitful collaboration between the author of the 
dissertation along with Dr. Michael Fire, Mr. Dima Kagan, and Prof. Yuval Elovici. 
It is worth mentioning that the work presented herein consists of research studies that 
have been published in international conferences, workshops, and journals. In 
particular, the characterization study presented in Section 3 and 4, led to the following 
publications: 
 
 Aviad Elyashar, Michael Fire, Dima Kagan, and Yuval Elovici. 
“Guided socialbots: Infiltrating the social networks of specific organizations' 
employees”, AI Communications, IOS Press, 2014.  
 
 Aviad Elyashar, Michael Fire, Dima Kagan, and Yuval Elovici.  
“Homing Socialbots: Intrusion on a specific organizations employee using 
Socialbots”, SNAA - Social Network Analysis in Applications 2013, Niagara 
Falls, Ontario, Canada, 2013. 
 
 Aviad Elyashar, Michael Fire, Dima Kagan, and Yuval Elovici. 
“Organizational Intrusion: Organization Mining using Socialbots”, 2012 
International Conference on Social Informatics (SocialInformatics), Lausanne, 
Switzerland.  
 
Other publications which focused on developing tools for improving privacy among 
users resulted in the following: 
 
 Michael Fire, Dima Kagan, Aviad Elyashar, and Yuval Elovici, “Friends or 
Foe? Fake Profile Identification in Online Social Networks,” Springer Journal 
of Social Network Analysis and Mining (SNAM), 2014, In Press. 
 
 Dima Kagan, Michael Fire, Aviad Elyashar, and Yuval Elovici, “Facebook 
Applications Installation and Removal- Temporal Analysis”, The Third 
International Conference on Social Eco-Informatics (SOTICS), Lisbon, 
Portugal, November 2013.   
 
 Michael Fire, Dima Kagan, Aviad Elyashar ,and Yuval Elovici " Social 
Privacy Protector - Protecting Users’ Privacy in Social Networks" SOTICS 
2012 : The Second International Conference on Social Eco-Informatics 
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1.3. Organization 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: In Section 2 we provide an 
extensive overview of literature that focuses on similar issues to those which we 
discuss in the current study. Section 3 describes the experimental framework and 
methods we used in order to carry out our two experiments. Furthermore, this section 
includes the algorithms we developed for the mining of data of organizations as well 
as reaching specific employees, the obstacles we faced during these experiments, and 
the datasets we used in order to evaluate our methods. Section 4 presents our numeric 
results. Section 5 includes ethical considerations that arose during this study. Section 
6 presents a discussion regarding the results, and Section 7 presents our conclusions 
and future research directions. 
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2. Literature Overview 
In this section, we describe several studies related to the issues we focus on in the 
thesis to provide helpful background information and additional insights.  
First, we concentrate on OSNs. We attempt to understand what the term “online 
social network” means, and explore the reasons for OSN success. Then, we show how 
much diversity OSNs provide for their users. Later, we explore the threats involved 
when using OSNs and the privacy problems that exist within them.   
Moreover, we outline studies involving trust issues, the crawling of OSNs, clustering 
methods for analyzing organizations, the use of socialbots—including definitions, 
studies that used socialbots for attacking, and the identification of socialbots.  
Finally, we review security tools that protect OSN users. 
2.1. Online Social Networks 
In this section, we discuss studies that focused on OSNs. 
2.1.1. Online Social Networks Definition  
In 2007, Boyd et al. [6] defined OSNs. They defined them as web-based services that 
provide individuals with an infrastructure to create a public or private profile account 
within a bounded system. This system enables a user to establish a profile that 
includes a list of other users with whom he or she shares connections. Typically, these 
other users are defined as the user’s friends. Moreover, users can view and traverse 
their list of connections and those made by others within this system. 
2.1.2. Reasons for Attraction  
The success of OSN usage among users may be attributed to several factors. Users 
want to stay connected with their surroundings, and by registering with OSNs, they 
can stay updated about their friends’ whereabouts and maintain closer relationships 
with them [7].  
Others utilize OSNs to promote businesses. For years, self-employed individuals such 
as barbers, plumbers, or accountants have been using OSNs to publicize their 
businesses in order to increase their customer base.  
Today, users even rely upon OSNs in order to initiate romantic relationships [9]. 
Malicious users are also attracted to OSNs as these platforms are deemed fertile 
ground for running astroturf campaigns. The goal in conducting such campaigns is to 
spread misinformation and propaganda in order to bias public opinion [1], [20]. Other 
attackers use OSNs for spreading spam [8] and even to influence users with 
manipulation [18]. 
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2.1.3. Diversity 
There is a great diversity among OSNs; they offer a variety of networks to correlate 
with different aspects of users’ lives. The largest OSN in the world is Facebook with 
more than one billion users [21], [22]. However, there are many more OSNs which 
help users to connect based on shared interests, political views, or common activities. 
These include LinkedIn, one of the world’s largest professional networks; Xing, a 
European social business network for business professionals; Academia.edu,5 a social 
networking site for academics and researchers; Athlinks,6 a social networking website 
aimed at competitive endurance athletes; and many more. 
2.1.4. The Privacy Problem in Online Social Networks 
One of the major problems in OSNs revolves around the privacy issue. Most of the 
OSNs allow Internet users to create a user profile in order to present themselves in the 
social networks, and to initiate connections with others. This procedure enables 
positive actions, such as finding new friends and colleagues based on common 
interests and activities, political views, sexual attraction, etc.; however, there are also 
many negative implications pertaining to this procedure. Most of the time in order to 
present themselves on OSNs, users upload pictures and publish private and personal 
information about themselves, such as their name, age, gender, sexual orientation, 
preferred establishments, phone numbers, address,  etc. 
                
For example, in 2005, Gross et al. [23] discussed patterns of information exposure in 
OSNs and their privacy implications. They examined the online behavior of more 
than four thousand university students in a popular social network in terms of the 
amount of disclosed information by users and their implantation of privacy settings. 
Eventually, they concluded that only small numbers of students changed their privacy 
preferences from the default privacy preferences, which expose too much information 
regarding users.        
 
In 2006, Barnes [24] discussed privacy issues within OSNs. She found OSN sites to 
be like a magnet, which attracts many American youngsters. She indicated that 
teenagers using OSNs freely shared personal information. This personal information 
attracts sexual predators. In general, she declared that many people may not be aware 
of the fact that their privacy is in danger and that they are not doing anything to 
protect their personal information. Such sensitive information can come in the form of 
home address, phone numbers, pictures, etc. The solution Barnes arrived at is not a 
simple one; in order to tackle issues which can result in the loss of teens’ Internet 
privacy, a keen awareness and effort on all levels of the society must be brought about 
and executed.  
 
In 2009, Lindamood et al. [25] argued that some of the information revealed on social 
networks is private and it is possible that corporations could use learning algorithms 
on the released data in order to predict undisclosed private information. They found 
that removing trait details and friendship links is the best way to reduce classifier 
accuracy. 
                                                           
5 http://academia.edu 
6 http://athlinks.com 
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2.1.5. OSN Threats 
Along with the numerous benefits that OSNs provide, such as maintaining 
relationships, finding new colleagues, and promoting businesses, there are also many 
threats that may jeopardize the security of OSN users, as well as that of their 
workplaces. These threats can be divided into three major classifications. 
2.1.5.1. Individual Security 
The first is that threats pose a danger to individual security. Today, many OSN users 
are unaware of the serious privacy issues that accompany the use of OSNs [10]. Users 
often share personal data on OSNs without realizing the short-term or long-term 
consequences of such information-flow [24], [26]. Gathered data that discloses 
personal and sensitive information about users may cause security risks, including: 
identity theft [8]; inference attacks [27]; spreading spam [10], [28]; privacy threats 
[1], [29]; malware [30]; fake profiles or sybils [31], [32]; socialbots [1], [33]; and 
sexual harassment [34], [35]. 
2.1.5.2.  Business Security 
The second threat is that to business security. Malicious users may engage in 
industrial espionage by creating fake profiles or bots in order to connect to users who 
are key employees in targeted organizations. By so doing, the hackers gain access to 
monitor the information that users disclose [11], [36]. An exposed user’s information 
pertaining to an organization may result in a loss of intellectual assets and confidential 
business information, as well as sensitive business data, which could make the 
company vulnerable to stock market manipulation and cybercrimes – ultimately 
setting the organization back hundreds of millions of dollars every year [37]. 
Moreover, malicious users may spread rumors regarding the targeted organization that 
could result in serious reputational damage, without the ability to track the source of 
the rumors [38], [39]. 
2.1.5.3.  National Security 
The third major classifications of threats are those posed to national security. Soldiers 
may inadvertently disclose confidential operational information to their friends 
through OSNs [40]. The enemy may collect these national secrets, like undisclosed 
locations, and use this information as an advantage in the future. Moreover, hackers 
may use virtual identities in order to spread propaganda by connecting with key users 
in the OSN to demoralize the opponent's society. Furthermore, the enemy may use the 
exposed information to run astroturf campaigns for spreading propaganda or 
misinformation regarding important issues such as US political elections [1], [41], 
[42].  Moreover, in recent years, some terrorists around the world utilized OSNs as a 
covert communication channel by which they operated to better organize and 
coordinate dispersed activities [43]. 
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2.1.6. Targeted Online Social Networks 
During our study, we utilized the Facebook and Xing OSNs to conduct our 
experiments. In this section, we provide a brief overview of each one of these 
networks. 
2.1.6.1. Facebook 
With more than 1.49 billion monthly active users as of June 30, 2015, Facebook 
stands out among all other popular OSNs in the world. According to Facebook, there 
are 1.31 billion active monthly users of its mobile products. On average, Facebook 
has 968 million active daily users, and 83.1% of them are outside the U.S. and Canada 
[21]. The average Facebook user has around 190 friends [44]. 
 
According to Facebook’s estimations [45], 8.7% of its accounts are defined as fake, 
meaning that Facebook includes tens of millions of fake accounts. Moreover, 4.8% of 
Facebook accounts are defined as duplicate accounts—ones that users maintain in 
addition to their principal accounts. Furthermore, 2.4% of Facebook users are defined 
as user-misclassified accounts, referring to users who have created personal profiles 
for a business, organization, or non-human entity, such as a pet. Of Facebook’s fake 
accounts, 1.5% are defined as undesirable accounts, i.e., belonging to malicious users. 
Undesirable accounts are defined as fake accounts which were created with the intent 
of being used for purposes that violate Facebook’s terms of service, such as 
spamming or distributing other malicious links and content. 
 
Regarding security issues, Facebook uses the FIS (Facebook Immune System) [46] 
and provides an additional privacy settings tool which enables users to edit their 
profile and decide which information will be accessible to others. However, this tool 
matched Facebook users’ expectations only 63% of the time. Furthermore, the 
Facebook privacy settings tend to expose content to more users than expected [47]. 
 
2.1.6.2. Xing 
Xing is a social network for business professionals. It was founded in Hamburg, 
Germany in 2003 and has been publicly listed since 2006. Xing has around 8.8 
million members worldwide, 8.4 million of whom are based in German-speaking 
countries [48]. Most Xing users use this OSN to promote their businesses, boost their 
career, or find a job. 
 
Furthermore, Xing provides a suitable platform for professionals to meet, find jobs, 
connect with colleagues, collaborate, share new ideas, etc. [48] Regarding security 
issues, Xing provides information about how active a given user is (based on the 
frequency of a user’s visits)—information which is referred to as activity. With this 
data, we can assess the activity level of Xing users. 
 
Moreover, Xing keeps track of the number of unconfirmed users, i.e., users who did 
not confirm a specific user. When a user is unconfirmed one hundred times, Xing 
prevents the user from sending additional friend requests [49]. To the best of our 
knowledge Xing does not publish statistics regarding the number of fake users within 
the network. 
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2.2. Trust 
OSNs in general as well as socialbots, base their success on trust. Users tend to trust 
other users based on several properties such as gender, occupation, connections, etc. 
As a result, users increase their friend list and their usage of OSNs.   
In 2007, Dwyer et al. [50] focused on the issues of trust and privacy within OSNs. 
The researchers compared two well-known OSNs, Facebook and MySpace, and came 
to the conclusion that with regard to online interaction, trust is less important in the 
construction of new relationships than it is in face-to-face encounters. Furthermore, 
they were able to show that trust along with the willingness to share information do 
not automatically translate into new social interactions online. They found that 
Facebook members revealed more information than MySpace members, however, the 
latter were found to be more likely to extend online relationships beyond the bounds 
of the social networking site, despite weaker trust results. Malicious users take 
advantage of this fact in order to spread themselves in these sites and find victims. 
In 2010, Ryan et al. [51] conducted the Robin Sage Experiment. In their experiment 
they created a false identity named Robin Sage and activated the identity on various 
social networking websites. Robin joined networks in order to influence users. In this 
case, the influence was reflected in the ability to gain the trust of other users, while 
having them share sensitive information with the false identity. The main points of 
interest observed by Ryan et al. were the ability to exploit strangers’ level of trust 
based on attributes such as occupation, gender, education, and friends. This 
experiment was conducted over the span of a month and ultimately, Robin gained 
hundreds of friends on various social networking sites. Among her friends were 
executives at government entities such as the NSA (National Security Agency), 
military intelligence groups, Fortune Global 500 corporations, and so on. Moreover, 
the false identity even received gifts, government and corporate jobs offers and even 
invitations to speak at several security conferences. Ryan et al. attributed the success 
of this experiment to several factors. First, the security industry is dominated by males 
which makes the female presence a rarity in this sector. For this reason, they 
deliberately chose a young, attractive female for the fabricated identity. Secondly, 
Robin’s education and credentials combined with her certifications deemed her an 
experienced security professional–driving others to connect with her for career 
opportunities, knowledge expansion, and so on. 
 
2.3. Crawling Social Networks 
In recent years there have been several studies conducted which focused on crawling 
OSNs for many reasons. The crawling process is often done for the retrieval of large 
amounts of information from OSNs.  
For example, in 2007, Chau et al. [52] emphasized how easy it is to retrieve 
information from OSNs. Chau et al. described their implementation of crawlers for 
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OSNs. These crawlers were able to visit a total of approximately 11 million auction 
users. 
In 2010, Kwak et al. [53] crawled a considerable amount of Twitter7 information. 
They gathered 41.7 million user profiles, 1.47 billion social relations, 4,262 trending 
topics, and 106 million tweets. 
In 2012, Fire et al. [11] analyzed different organizations through data mining 
techniques. The analysis process was based on information from organizations' 
employees revealed on Facebook, LinkedIn, Google search results, the company's 
web page and other publicly available sources. To accomplish their goal, they 
designed and built a novel web crawler. This web crawler extracted information about 
the given network such as informal social relationships of employees of a given target 
organization. In contrast with standard crawlers, which were found to be insufficient 
in performing data collection as they collected many irrelevant profiles and skipped 
Facebook users who worked in a target organization, the newly designed web crawler 
optimized data collection from users associated with a specific group or organization. 
Fire et al. collected publicly available data from six well-known hi-tech companies on 
three different scales using the new web crawler. 
In 2013, Stern et al. [54] introduced the Target Oriented Network Intelligence 
Collection (TONIC) problem. The goal of this problem was to find OSN profiles that 
contain information regarding a given target using automated crawling. Stern et al. 
attempted to retrieve information regarding a specific target while avoiding further 
crawling. They defined TONIC as a heuristic search problem and solved it with 
Artificial Intelligence techniques. They evaluated their problem on data set from 
Google+ OSN that included 211,000 profiles with 1.5 million links between them. 
Eventually, Stern et al. found that the Bayesian Promising heuristic significantly 
outperforms other heuristics. 
 
2.4.  Clustering Methods for Analyzing Organizations 
In 1979, Tichy et al. [55] described a technique for analyzing organizations using a 
network that included several network structure attributes, such as clustering, 
centrality, and density. Moreover, they used their framework to present an analysis of 
two organizations with several hundred employees. 
 
In 2002, Krebs [56] studied Al-Qaeda’s organizational network structure attributes 
following the September 11th attacks. They successfully discovered the organization's 
leader by using the degree and closeness structural properties of vertices. 
 
In 2007, Mishra et al. [57] introduced a new criterion for clustering ubiquitous social 
networks and provided an algorithm for discovering clusters. They indicated that their 
algorithm succeeded in finding good clusters. 
                                                           
7 https://twitter.com 
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2.5.  Socialbots 
We focused on socialbot attacks. In recent years, several adversaries are using them to 
accomplish many goals [1], [8], [12], [13], [14], [16].   
2.5.1.  Socialbots Definition 
Socialbots are defined as automatic or semi-automatic computer programs that control 
OSN accounts and perform human behaviors such as sending friend requests and 
messages, and so on [1], [18].  
Unlike a regular bot such as a Twitter bot or spambot, a socialbot hides its robot 
identity. In many cases, socialbots are programmed to infiltrate communities within 
OSNs and pass themselves off as human beings. Adversaries maintain socialbots for 
stealing or accessing sensitive information that they are not allowed to access, in the 
interest of reaching an influential position in order to spread misinformation or 
propaganda [1], [20]. 
2.5.2. Attacking Socialbots 
In recent years, several studies introduced potential socialbot attacks on users. 
In 2007, a study was conducted by Sophos regarding the risks of identity and 
information theft on Facebook [58]. The authors created a fabricated Facebook profile 
under the name Freddi Staur. Under this name, they manually sent friend requests to 
two-hundred users across the world. Eventually, eighty-seven out of two-hundred 
Facebook users accepted the friend request from the fabricated profile, yielding a 41% 
success rate. Moreover, the authors were able to gather sensitive and personal details 
about these users because of their acceptance of the requests. The details included 
their email addresses, dates of birth, phone numbers, photos of family and friends, 
hobbies, employer, etc. 
In 2009, Bonneau et al. [59] investigated the difficulties of collecting profiles and 
then graphed information from the Facebook OSN. They examined several methods 
of collecting data—among them, false profiles. They detailed two techniques for 
working with false profiles. The first was to create false profiles in several networks 
which could lead to instant access to the profiles of most users. The second technique 
was to send friend requests to “highly connected users who [were] more likely than 
average to accept a friend request from a stranger” [59]. They found that creating a 
false profile and sending friendship requests became effective only with friend-of-
friend privacy settings. 
In 2009, Bilge et al. [8] demonstrated potential attacks of launching a crawling 
campaign and identity theft attacks against several OSNs including Xing, StudiVZ,8 
MeinVZ,9 Facebook and LinkedIn, in order to gather personal and sensitive 
information. The attacks were divided into two parts: the first attack was a classic 
                                                           
8http://www.studivz.net  
9 http://www.meinvz.net 
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identity theft in which Bilge et al. cloned several user profiles of victims and sent 
friend requests to their contacts. By accepting the friend requests, they were able to 
access sensitive information of the friends of the victim. Moreover, the second part of 
the attack was more complex in that the attackers launched a cross-site profile-cloning 
attack. In this attack, they identified users who had a profile account in one OSN and 
not in another. They cloned the profile account of the victim in the first OSN and 
forged a new profile in another OSN where the victim was not registered. Using this 
method, Bilge et al. rebuilt the OSN of the victim by contacting the victim's friends in 
both OSNs. 
Moreover, in 2011, Boshmaf et al. [1] demonstrated the vulnerability of OSNs to a 
large-scale infiltration campaign by socialbots. They built a network of socialbots and 
operated them on Facebook for eight weeks. In this campaign, the army of socialbots 
attempted to connect with many Facebook users. The results included three main 
conclusions. First, OSNs such as Facebook, can be infiltrated with a success rate of up 
to eighty percent. They were able to demonstrate that the more friends a user has, the 
more likely the user is to respond positively to friend requests. Secondly, depending 
on users’ privacy settings, successful infiltration can result in privacy breaches in 
which even more of the users’ data is exposed as compared to that which is exposed 
with strictly public access. And thirdly, for all practical purposes, the security defense 
of Facebook, dubbed the Facebook Immune System (FIS), was found not to be very 
effective in detecting or stopping large-scale infiltration campaigns. 
Additionally, Magdon-Ismail et al. [60] studied the infiltration of trust based on an 
OSN utilizing an agent which sent friend requests. Its mission was to amass as many 
connections as possible. They developed a model for infiltration based on two 
properties of actors in the network. First, actors would like to have as many 
connections with others as possible. Secondly, actors were more likely to connect to 
trusted nodes. Based on this research, they established a number of conclusions. First, 
the trust effect is crucial. If an agent is not trusted enough, then it would be difficult to 
infiltrate a network because of its robustness. Secondly, there is the importance of the 
network structure. If the trust effect is small, then well-clustered networks like typical 
OSNs are easier to infiltrate. Moreover, where the trust effect is larger, networks with 
a large expansion are easier to infiltrate. Thirdly, the algorithm used by the agent is 
crucial for the success of infiltration. Random requests are less successful with 
infiltration than greedier strategies. 
In 2013, Mitter et al. [61] suggested a categorization scheme of socialbot attacks. 
Moreover, the recent socialbot attacks are characterized according to the 
categorization scheme they created.  They defined dimensions for describing and 
categorizing socialbot attacks: targets, account types, vulnerabilities, attack methods 
and results. 
Also, in 2013, Zhen [15] proposed a spam campaign by using socialbots. In order to 
do so, he performed several actions, such as creating socialbots, choosing legitimate 
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accounts, forming friendships, earing trust, and spreading spam. His method, which 
was based on socialbots, earned him the trust of other users in OSNs and allowed him 
to carry out his spam campaign. 
Additionally, Boshmaf et al. [16] continued with their infiltration investigation, 
generating two novel and significant conclusions. First, they used a mathematical 
model in order to calculate the profit of an adversary to operate a socialbot network. 
Eventually, they found that a rational adversary would utilize the socialbot network as 
a tool for collecting private user information in order to run more profitable, 
adversarial campaigns, such as email-based spam and phishing campaigns. Secondly, 
protection against socialbots poses many challenges relating to issues such as web 
automation, online-offline identity binding, and usable security. 
In 2014, Mitter et al. [62] explored the ability of socialbot attacks to influence the 
social graph on OSNs. They conducted an empirical study in which they tried to 
understand to what degree socialbots were able to influence link creation between 
targeted real users within OSNs. In order to test this, Mitter et al. analyzed a dataset 
from a socialbot experiment on Twitter which was conducted three years before. 
Eventually, they found that the creation of links within OSNs could not be explained 
solely by this dataset. Moreover, they suggested that external factors drive link 
creation behavior.  
Moreover, in 2014, Freitas et al. [63] attempted to understand the infiltration 
strategies of socialbots on the Twitter OSN. They created one hundred and twenty 
socialbot accounts which differed in their characteristics and strategies. They 
investigated the extent to which these socialbots were able to infiltrate the Twitter 
OSN over the duration of a month. Eventually, they found that out of the 120 
socialbots they created, only 31% could be detected by Twitter. According to their 
findings, they suggested that automated strategies were able to infiltrate Twitter 
defense mechanisms. Moreover, even socialbots which used simple automated 
techniques to follow other Twitter users and post tweets gained a significant amount 
of followers and triggered many interactions from other users. Regarding finding the 
characteristics of socialbots that would enable them to evade Twitter defenses, Freitas 
et al. found that higher Twitter activity is the most important factor for successful 
infiltration. Other factors like the gender and the profile image were found to gain 
some importance.    
2.5.3. Detecting Socialbots  
Along with studies that tried to gather leaked information about users within OSNs 
and even in some cases to infiltrate them, there were several studies that tried to 
suggest solutions to these privacy issues. The solutions were based on the detection of 
fake profiles and socialbots. Quick identification of malicious users within OSNs may 
help innocent users as well as OSN operators to defend themselves against these 
malicious users. The techniques for detecting these malicious users were varied and 
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included identification using machine learning [64], [65] as well as creating 
honeypots for attracting spammers [66]. 
In 2010, Benevenuto et al. [64] attempted to detect spammers on Twitter. They first 
collected a large dataset of the Twitter OSN, which included more than fifty-four 
million users, 1.9 billion links, and almost 1.8 billion tweets. Afterward, they 
manually classified spammers and non-spammers. They were able to identify several 
characteristics related to the content of tweets and users’ social-behavior for detecting 
spammers. They used these characteristics for classifying users as either spammers or 
non-spammers by machine learning techniques. Eventually, they succeeded in 
detecting approximately seventy percent of spammers and ninety-six percent of non-
spammers. 
Also in 2010, Chu et al. [33] attempted to help human users in identifying who they 
were interacting with. They focused on the classification of human, bot and cyborg 
accounts on Twitter. In order to detect them, they crawled the Twitter OSN and 
collected information regarding half a million accounts on Twitter. Eventually, they 
found differences between human, bots and cyborgs in terms of tweeting behavior, 
tweet content, and account attributes. Based on their findings, they suggested an 
automated classification system. This system included four components: an entropy-
based component, a machine-learning component, an account properties component, 
and a decision maker. This system took into account all of these components and 
determined the likelihood of a given user to be a human, bot, or cyborg. 
 
Likewise in 2010, Lee et al. [66] proposed a honeypot-based approach for discovering 
OSN spammers. Their approach was based on creating social honeypots within the 
MySpace and Twitter OSNs in order to attract spammers to attack. With these 
honeypots, they developed statistical user models in order to distinguish between 
social spammers and legitimate users. Eventually, their honeypots succeeded in 
identifying social spammers with low false positive rates. 
In 2010, Stringhini et al. [67] created several “honey-profiles” on three large OSNs: 
Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter. Later, they analyzed the collected data and were 
able to identify anomalous behaviors of users. Eventually, they were able to detect 
and delete 15,857 spam profiles. Through these actions, they succeeded in proving 
that it is possible to automatically identify the profiles that were used by spammers. 
In 2011, Ratkiewicz et al. [42] detailed the abuse of microblogging services like 
Twitter for illegitimate use. Their study focused on political astroturf which is defined 
as a campaign disguised as spontaneous, popular behavior, when in reality these 
campaigns are carried out by a single person or organization. Ratkiewicz et al. 
demonstrated a web service that follows political memes on Twitter. Memes are 
defined as elements of a culture that may be considered to be passed by non-genetic 
means, especially imitation [68]. The researchers used this web service in order to 
detect astroturfing, smear campaigns and other misinformation in the context of U.S. 
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elections. In this study, the researchers emphasized the importance of the early 
identification of accounts associated with astroturf memes. 
In 2012, Fire et al. [65] developed an algorithm for the detection of spammers and 
fake profiles in OSNs. Their method was based solely on the topological features of 
the OSN. Fire et al. attempted to detect anomalies in the topology of OSNs. The 
proposed method is based on a combination of graph theory algorithms and machine 
learning and has been evaluated based on the datasets of three different OSNs: 
Academia.edu,10 AnyBeat,11 and Google+.12 The dataset from Academia.edu 
contained more than 200,000 users and almost 1.4 million links. Regarding AnyBeat, 
the topology contained 12,645 users and 67,053 links, and the dataset from Google+ 
contained more than 211,187 users and 1,506,896 links. Eventually, the researchers 
were able to detect several fake profiles. Furthermore, they found differences 
regarding the characteristics of each of the OSNs and their users. They concluded that 
their algorithms could provide sufficient protection for small and medium sized OSNs 
with several million users. However, the algorithms were not sufficient for large scale 
OSNs.  
In 2013, Wang et al. [69] built a system for the identification of fake profiles using 
server-side clickstream models. The detection process was based on converting 
similar user clickstreams into behavioral clusters by capturing distances between 
clickstream sequences. Wang et al. tested their developed models on 16,000 real and 
Sybil users from Renren,13 a large Chinese OSN. Eventually, they showed that their 
method worked with high detection accuracy. 
Also in 2013, Wald et al. [70] explored a dataset that contained 610 users, who 
received messages from Twitter bots. They attempted to find features that helped in 
detecting bots. After, they built models with classifiers for predicting if a user would 
interact with a bot.  
In 2014, Wagner et al. [18] thought that modern social media security defenses 
needed to advance in order to be able to detect social-bot attacks. In their opinion, 
identifying socialbots was crucial. As a result, identifying users who were susceptible 
to socialbot attacks - and implementing the means to protect against such attacks - 
was also important. Wagner et al. defined two separate identities: target and 
susceptible user. A target represents a user who has been chosen by socialbots to be a 
target for an attack. A susceptible user is a user who has been infected by a socialbot. 
This kind of infection is defined as cooperation of the user with the agenda of a 
socialbot. They attempted to identify factors for detecting users who were susceptible 
to socialbot attacks. In order to find these factors, Wagner et al. studied data from an 
experiment conducted by WebEcologyProject. The experiment was termed, the Social 
Bot Challenge 2011. In this experiment, three teams implemented several socialbots. 
Each one of them attempted to influence user behavior on the Twitter OSN. The 
                                                           
10 https://www.academia.edu 
11 https://www.anybeat.com 
12 https://plus.google.com 
13 http://www.renren-inc.com/en 
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socialbots persuaded targets to interact with them by replying to them, mentioning 
them in their tweets, retweeting them or following them. The group of targets 
included 500 unsuspecting Twitter users which were selected based on the fact that 
they had an interest in or tweeted about cats. A susceptible user was defined as a 
target that interacted at least once with a socialbot. For example, the user replied, 
mentioned, retweeted or followed the socialbot. They used the data in order to 
develop models for identifying susceptible users among a given set of targets and 
predicting users’ level of susceptibility.  Eventually, they were able to introduce three 
groups of features: network, behavior and linguistic features.  
 
In 2014, Paradise et al. [17] investigated monitoring strategies for detecting socialbots 
within OSNs. They evaluated socialbot attack and defense strategies using a 
simulation tool. The simulation consisted of nodes and connections on real OSN data. 
They implemented four attack strategies and six defense methods.    
 
Recently, Abulaish et al. [71] developed an ensemble learning method for detecting 
spammers. They evaluated the performance of several basic ensemble classifiers over 
individual features of legitimate users and spammers on OSNs. In their study, 
Abulaish et al. extracted structural features from user interaction patterns of OSN 
users. Their real dataset included wall post activities of 63,891 Facebook users. 
Finally, they found that the bagging ensemble learning approach using the J48 
decision tree performed better than an individual model, and also than other ensemble 
learning methods.   
 
2.5.4. Security Tools for Protecting Users 
In recent years, spammers, and hackers have found OSNs to be an efficient platform 
for spreading malware and spam. Moreover, Rahman et al. [72] found that at least 
thirteen percent of the applications on Facebook are malicious. The development of 
designated tools for users’ protection is one of the ways to protect users on OSNs 
against spammers and hackers. 
For example, in 2011, Stein et al. [46] described the Facebook Immune System (FIS). 
Like the human immune system, the FIS is described as a system, which in this case, 
protects Facebook from adversaries and malicious attacks. The FIS is an adversarial 
learning system which performs real-time checks and classifications on every read-
and-write action in Facebook’s database. These checks exist in order to protect 
Facebook users and the entire social network from malicious activities. Furthermore, 
Stein et al. described the design of the FIS and the challenges faced by the FIS. 
Due to the significant problem of hackers’ usage of applications for the potential 
spreading of malware and spam, in 2012, Rahman et al. [72] developed the FRAppE 
tool for detecting malicious Facebook applications. They found a set of attributes that 
helped to distinguish between malicious applications and benign ones. Moreover, they 
revealed that FRAppE can detect malicious apps with 99.5% accuracy, with no false 
positives and a low false negative rate (4.1%).  
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In 2013, Fire et al. [73] developed the Social Privacy Protector (SPP) software for 
improving users’ security and privacy on Facebook. The Social Privacy Protector 
software contained three protection layers. The first layer analyzed Facebook users’ 
friend lists in order to recognize which friends of users were thought to be fake. This 
application enabled the users to restrict access to the users’ personal information via 
fake profiles. The second layer expanded Facebook’s basic privacy settings based on 
different types of OSN user profiles. The last layer warned users about the number of 
installed applications on their Facebook profile. More than 3,000 users from more 
than twenty different countries installed this software, with 527 actually using the 
software. Overall, users who installed the SPP restricted more than nine thousand 
users, and at least 1,792 Facebook applications were removed. By analyzing the 
dataset obtained by this software, together with machine learning techniques, they 
developed classifiers in order to predict which Facebook profiles had a high 
probability of being fake, therefore, posing a risk to users. 
Furthermore, in 2013, Kagan et al. [74] developed a Firefox add-on that alerted users 
to the number of installed applications on their Facebook profiles. The dataset they 
collected consists of data from 2,945 users. Eventually, they found a linear correlation 
between the average percentage change of newly installed Facebook applications and 
the number of days passed since the user initially installed their Firefox add-on. 
Furthermore, they discovered that users who used the add-on became more aware of 
security and privacy issues as this was reflected by the fact that these users installed, 
on average, fewer new applications. 
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3. Detailed Description of the Conducted Research 
3.1. Research Hypotheses  
In recent years, adversaries have found OSNs to be favorite targets for attacks. Most 
of them have chosen to carry out their attacks using socialbots [62]. These malicious 
users use socialbots for several reasons. Some of the adversaries use socialbots for 
influencing users or spreading misinformation and propaganda. One famous 
manifestation of spreading misinformation and propaganda by socialbots was during 
the U.S. political elections [41], [62]. Others apply socialbots for reconnaissance 
regarding organizations and employees [17]. Another group of malicious users use 
socialbots in order to infiltrate users [1], [8], [12], [13], [14]. All kinds of these attacks 
could result in fraud as well as loss of intellectual assets and confidential business 
information [11].   
 
Our hypothesis was divided into two assumptions. The first assumption was based on 
the fact that adversaries can utilize socialbots for mining the data of targeted 
organizations. In this study, we used two types of socialbots: passive and active 
socialbots.  
 
Passive socialbots are defined as public user accounts that we created in order to 
crawl and gain employees who worked or currently work in a given targeted 
organization. These passive socialbots were created only for crawling purposes. These 
socialbots do not send friend requests to other OSN users. Therefore, they have no 
friends within an OSN.  By crawling with passive socialbots, we expected to gather 
the public information regarding a targeted organization, which includes 
organizational connections and employees.  
 
As opposed to passive socialbots, active socialbots are defined as public user accounts 
that perform various types of social activities, such as uploading posts, or sending 
friend requests to other OSN users. By using active socialbots, we attempted to find 
new additional organizational employees and inner organizational connections within 
OSNs that we could not find by crawling with passive socialbots. These potential 
employees could be employees who have more strict privacy settings than those who 
we would be able to find with the passive socialbots.        
 
Furthermore, our second assumption was based on previous studies, which noted that 
many OSN users are unaware of the privacy issues that accompany the use of OSNs 
[10]. We validated this assumption by using socialbots. We attempted to understand 
to what extent users are unaware of various privacy issues. This validation process 
was carried out in hopes that our socialbot would be accepted as a friend by specific 
employees in targeted organizations. 
 
These two assumptions were tested and are described in the next sections. Both 
assumptions emphasize the privacy issues which exist within OSNs.  
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3.2. Methods 
In this section we present two algorithms which involve the use of socialbots. The 
first algorithm is considered organization data mining, whereas the second algorithm 
is considered reaching specific users in targeted organizations. 
Most OSNs require users to create accounts in order to establish connections with 
other network users [61]. In many cases, a user’s account may include personal data 
such as photographs, birthday, hometown, ethnicity, and personal interests [1]. In 
most undirected OSNs, users connect to one another by transmitting friend requests. 
The recipient must accept the friend request in order to establish a friend link with the 
initiator of the request. When this process has been completed, the two parties acquire 
the privilege of accessing each other’s profile details at will. Therefore, we decided to 
define an accepted friend request as an infiltration to the social network of the user. 
Our algorithms were based on the establishment of socialbots on OSNs. The idea was 
that when users accept these socialbots’ friend requests, these socialbots gain 
increased access to users’ profiles and may gather additional information about users 
and, in some cases, information about the user’s friends [1], [8], [13], [14], [16]. 
The following sections (see Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2) present the two algorithms for 
testing our assumptions thoroughly. Section 3.2.1 focuses on the first assumption 
while Section 3.2.2 focuses on the second.    
 
3.2.1. The Mining of Data of a Targeted Organization 
To mine information regarding a targeted organization, several actions, as depicted in 
Algorithm 1, had to take place. First, we had to crawl the targeted organization's 
website and gather public information about its employees, who have a Facebook user 
account. For the crawling process, we created a passive socialbot (referred to as P) on 
Facebook, with no friends. We used the Organization Social Network Crawler, 
developed by Fire et al. [11]  and crawled with P (see line 1). This special crawler 
optimizes data collection from users associated with a specific group or organization. 
It distinguished from other standard crawlers by utilizing the homophily principle 
[75], which states that the more specific person’s friends have been employed by an 
organization, the more likely that this person was employed by the same organization 
at some point.     
 
After finishing crawling and gathering intelligence on the targeted organization's 
employees with the passive socialbot P, we created an active Facebook socialbot 
account (referred to as S) for every organization that we wanted to reach (see line 2). 
 
Before reaching a targeted organization, it was essential that the socialbot account 
profile look like a reliable profile of an actual person. For this reason, we added 
personal attributes of real profiles such as posts, images, interests, etc. [1], [8] (see 
line 3) 
 
Initially, we manually sent friend requests to fifty random users regardless of any 
organizational affiliation, who had more than a predefined threshold—such as a 
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minimum of a thousand friends (see line 4 -  7 ). The rationale for doing this was again 
based on Boshmaf et al.’s [1] observations which stated that “the more friends [a user] 
had, the higher the chance was that they [would] accept a friend request from a 
socialbot (i.e., a stranger).” 
After fifty random users accepted our socialbot friend requests, we started to 
automatically send friend requests to employees working in a targeted organization. In 
order to choose the right employees to send friend requests to, we sent friend requests 
to the employees of the target organization who had the highest number of friends 
(see line 8 - 10). It is important to mention that we conducted preliminarily 
intelligence manually, which helped us to reconstruct parts of the organization's social 
network, which revealed the users with the highest number of Facebook friends. 
  
After a socialbot made friends with at least ten organizational employees, we sent 
friend requests to the employees with the highest number of mutual friends with our 
socialbot in descending order (see line 11 - 13). We finished sending friend requests 
when we did not have employees that had a single mutual friend with our socialbot.  
Algorithm 1: Socialbot organizational intrusion  
Input: Uids - A set of seed URLs to Facebook profile pages of 
organization’s employees, P – Passive socialboat, S –  Active socialboat,  
O – targeted organization 
Output: A set of Facebook profiles and their connections 
1:  OrgPublicGraph ← Organizational-Crawler(P, Uids, O) 
2: S ← CreateActiveSocialbot(S, O) 
3:  S ← CreateReliableProfile(S) 
4:  i ← 0 
5:  while (NumOfFriends(S) <= 50) 
6:   SendFriendRequestToRandomUsers(S) 
7: end while 
8: while (NumOfOrgFriends(S) <= 10) 
9:  SendFriendRequestToOrgEmpMaxNumOfFriends(S) 
10:  end while 
11:  while (NumOfOrgFriends(S) <= MaxNumOfFriends) 
12:  SendFriendRequestToOrgEmpMaxMutualFriends(S) 
13: end while 
14: return Collect pages 
 
 
3.2.2. Reaching Specific Users in Targeted Organizations 
The suggested algorithm involved several actions: First, as it was depicted in 
Algorithm 1 we had to crawl targeted organizations and gather public information 
about employees who established user accounts and stated that they were working or 
worked in the targeted organizations in the past. The crawling process was based on 
the Facebook, and Xing OSNs and a passive socialbot account, P, that we created. 
The crawler was similar in its behavior to that which was introduced by Fire et al. 
[11]. The crawler received, as an input, a list of user IDs who were employees in the 
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targeted organization. It crawled their friends list and was able to gather users who 
were employees in the targeted organization (see line 1). 
Second, similarly to Algorithm 1, and prior to the infiltration of a targeted 
organization, we designed a user profile for our socialbot. It was important that it 
seemed like a reliable profile of an actual user, e.g., including photos, posts, etc. (see 
line 2 - 3).  
Third, by the end of the crawling process, we gained sufficient information about 
users who were working or had worked in the targeted organizations and their 
connections. In other words, we gathered intelligence on the targeted organizations’ 
employees, which we utilized in order to randomly select ten users to serve as targets 
for the reaching process. We then utilized their mutual friends in order to reach these 
targeted users (see line 4 - 8). 
Afterward, like in Algorithm 1, the active socialbots suggested friend requests to fifty 
random users that had more than one thousand friends (see line 9 - 11). 
 
After a socialbot succeeded in gaining a positive response to its friend request from 
fifty random users, it automatically sent friend requests to targeted users’ mutual 
friends who were employees in the same organization (see line 12 - 15). We then 
waited for the socialbot to gain fifty friends from random users as we wanted our 
socialbots to appear as much like genuine users as possible. We did not send friend 
requests to mutual friends of the targeted organizations when our socialbot had only a 
limited number of friends, as users tend not to accept requests from other users with 
only a few friends when they initiate a friend request. A lack of friends could cause 
other users to automatically reject our socialbot’s friend requests [12]. 
Fourth, for each chosen targeted user, we detected his or her friends inside the 
organization, and our socialbot sent friend requests to them. The process of sending 
friend requests was handled in descending order based on the targeted user’s number 
of friends: at first the socialbot sent friend requests to the most “friendly” users, i.e., 
those with the largest number of friends, and eventually, requests were sent to users 
with the fewest friends in the targeted organization. The idea was to gain as many 
mutual friends as possible, an accomplishment that may have increased the 
probability that a socialbot’s friend request would be accepted by a targeted user. 
Fifth, after the completion of the process of sending friend requests to targeted users’ 
mutual friends, we sent friend requests to the ten targeted users. Afterward, we 
observed how many of them accepted our socialbot’s friend requests (see lines 16 -
18). 
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Algorithm 2: Socialbot specific intrusion 
Input: Uids - A set of seed URLs to Facebook profile pages of an organization’s  
employees, 
 P – Passive socialbot, 
 S – Active socialbot,  
O – targeted organization, 
TU – targeted users,  
OG – organization’s graph 
1: OG ← Organizational-Crawler(P, Uids, O) 
2: S ← CreateActiveSocialbot(S, O) 
3: S ← CreateReliableProfile(S) 
4: i ← 0 
5: while (i < 10) do 
6:  TU ← RandomizeTargetedUsers(O)   
7:  i ← i + 1 
8: end while 
9: while (NumOfFriends(S) <= 50) 
10:  SendFriendRequestToRandomUsers(S) 
11: end while 
12: TUFriends ← FindOrgFriends(O, TU,  OrgPublicGraph) 
13: for ( f ∈ TUFriends) 
14:  SendFriendRequestInDescendingOrder (f) 
15: end for 
16: for (U ∈ TU) 
17:  SendFriendRequest (U) 
18: end for 
 
3.3. Targeted Online Social Networks 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of each one of these networks. 
Additionally, we describe in detail each of the organizations we crawled and analyze 
the datasets we were able to gather. 
3.3.1. Datasets 
In this section we present the datasets we worked on.  We carried out Algorithm 1 (see 
Section 3.2.1) on Facebook. In regards to Algorithm 2 (see Section 3.2.2), we tested it 
on two different OSNs: Facebook and Xing. 
 
3.3.1.1. The Mining of Data of Targeted Organizations 
In this section we present the datasets on which we tested Algorithm 1. All the 
targeted organizations were gathered from the Facebook OSN. 
Targeted Organizations. We decided to conduct our data mining on three 
organizations: 𝐎𝐅𝟏, 𝐎𝐅𝟐, and 𝐎𝐅𝟑. 
 
The 𝑶𝑭𝟏 organization is an international software company that develops, licenses, 
implements, and supports software applications for its customers. According to public 
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sources, the OF1 organization employs thousands and operates offices in North 
America, Europe, and the Middle East. 
 
In the primary crawling process with the passive socialbot P, we were able to expose 
1,859 informal connections of 309 Facebook users who noted on their Facebook 
profiles that they were employees in this targeted organization (see Table 1, and 
Figure 1a). 
 
 
Organizations Nodes Edges Clusters 
Cluster 
Average 
Size 
Cluster 
Max 
Size 
𝑶𝑭𝟏 309 1,859 35 8.6 92 
𝑶𝑭𝟐 413 3,536 19 21.421 130 
𝑶𝑭𝟑 1,484 19,484 141 9.851 268 
Table 1: Organizational datasets statistics 
Moreover, by using the Markov Clustering (MCL) algorithm [76] we were able to 
discover 35 clusters with an average size of 8.6 employees, and a maximal size of 92 
employees (see Figure 1b). MCL is a way to cluster a graph by flowing through a 
network. This algorithm has been widely used for clustering in biological networks. 
However, it demands that the graph be sparse, and therefore we found it problematic 
at times for our purposes. However, we tested many other clusters, and this was the 
only algorithm that found a different number of clusters when we compared the 
datasets P provided by crawling and the datasets the socialbot provided. 
 
The 𝑶𝑭𝟐 organization is a leading information technology company that specializes in 
the integration, development, and application of technologies, solutions and software 
products, hardware, infrastructure, etc. The company is located in Eastern Europe and 
the Middle East and has thousands of employees around the world. 
 
Primarily, in the crawling process with the passive socialbot P, we were able to 
expose 3,536 informal connections of 413 Facebook users, who listed on their 
Facebook profiles that they were employed by this targeted organization (see Table 1, 
and Figure 2a). Furthermore, by using the MCL algorithm we were able to discover 
19 clusters with an average size of 21.421 employees and a maximal size of 130 
employees (see Figure 2b). 
 
The 𝑶𝑭𝟑 organization is a technology company which develops, and markets 
telecommunications software. Moreover, this organization focuses on providing 
services to telecommunication service providers. According to public sources, the 𝑂𝐹3 
organization was founded in the 1980s and employs approximately 5,000 employees 
in the United States of America and the Middle East. 
 
In the primary crawling process with the passive socialbot P, we were able to expose 
19,484 informal connections of 1,484 Facebook users, who stated on their Facebook 
profiles that they were employees in this targeted organization (see Table 1, and 
Figure 3a). Furthermore, by using the MCL algorithm we were able to discover 141 
clusters with an average size of 9.851 employees and a maximum size of 268 
employees and minimum size of 2 employees (see Figure 3b). 
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(a) Organizational social network 
has been crawled by P 
Figure 1: OF1 organization 
(a) Organizational social 
network has been crawled 
by P 
(b) Clusters (before intrusion) 
(b) Organizational social 
network has been 
crawled by P 
(a) Clusters (before intrusion) 
Figure 3: OF3 organization 
(b) Clusters (before intrusion) 
Figure 2: OF2 organization 
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3.3.1.2. Reaching Specific Users 
We decided to reach specific employees who stated on their Facebook profile that 
they were employees of one of four targeted organizations. Eventually, we succeeded 
in reaching three of these organizations: 𝑂𝐹4, 𝑂𝐹5, and 𝑂𝐹6. 
 
Furthermore, on Xing, we used five socialbots for specific user infiltration of five 
different organizations. Eventually, we succeeded in infiltrating two of the 
organizations. We present the results from the attempts of SX1, SX2, SX3, SX4, and SX5 
socialbots that tried to reach specific employees in the targeted organizations OX1, 
OX2, and OX3 respectively (see Section 4). SX4 and SX5 were blocked in the first stage 
so they did not attack an organization. 
 
Targeted Organizations. The OF4 organization is the same OF1 organization that is 
mentioned in Section 3.3.3.1.14  
 
In the crawling process we identified 2,199 informal links of 330 Facebook users 
who, according to their Facebook profiles, work or have worked in this organization 
(see Table 2 and Figure 4a). 
 
 
Organizations Social Networks Nodes Edges 
𝑶𝑭𝟒 Facebook 330 2,199 
𝑶𝑭𝟓 Facebook 469 3,831 
𝑶𝑭𝟔 Facebook 918 10,986 
𝑶𝑿𝟏 Xing 107 369 
𝑶𝑿𝟐 Xing 1,237 14,408 
𝑶𝑿𝟑 Xing 416 4,153 
Table 2: Organizational datasets statistics 
The 𝑶𝑭𝟓 organization is the same OF2 organization that is mentioned in Section 
3.3.3.1.  
In the crawling process we discovered 3,831 informal links of 469 Facebook users 
who, according to their Facebook profiles, work or have worked in this organization 
(see Table 2 and Figure 4b). 
 
The 𝑶𝑭𝟔 organization is a telecommunications networking product provider that 
provides communication products and develops services for carriers, cable and 
multiple system operators, wireless/cellular service providers, etc. The OF6 
organization is located in the Middle and Far East, and according to public sources, 
maintains thousands of employees. In the crawling process, we identified 10,986 
informal links of 918 Facebook users who, according to their Facebook profiles, work 
or have worked in this organization (see Table 2 and Figure 4c). 
 
The 𝑶𝑿𝟏 organization is a large crude oil and natural gas producer. The activities of 
this organization include exploration and production of oil and natural gas as well as 
the natural gas trade, including transport and storage. This organization is based in 
Eastern and Western Europe, North Africa, and South America. OX1 maintains 
thousands of employees worldwide. In the crawling process, we identified 369 
                                                           
14 In order to differentiate between experiments, we used different names for the organizations. 
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informal links of 107 Xing users who, according to their profiles, work or have 
worked in this organization (see Table 2 and Figure 4d). 
 
The 𝑶𝑿𝟐 organization is a food company that serves as a manufacturer, retailer, and 
marketer of beverage concentrates. The organization is situated in the U.S but has 
branches worldwide. It manages hundreds of thousands of employees worldwide, and 
in this study we focused on the European branch of the OX2 organization. In the 
crawling process we identified 14,408 informal links of 1,237 Xing users who, 
according to their profiles, work or have worked in this organization (see Table 2, and 
Figure 4e). 
 
The 𝐎𝐗𝟑 organization is a corporation that develops, manufactures, and sells computer 
software, electronics, etc. This organization is American, but has numerous branches 
worldwide. OX3 has hundreds of thousands of employees worldwide. In this study, we 
focused on the European branch. In the crawling process we identified 4,153 informal 
links of 416 Xing users who, according to their Facebook profiles, work or have 
worked in this organization (see Table 2, and Figure 4f). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: OF4 organizational social 
network 
(b) OF5 organization 
 
(c) OF6 organization (a) OF4 organization 
(d) OX1 organization (e) OX2 organization 
Figure 4: Organizational social network 
(f) OX3 organization 
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3.4. Prevailing Difficulties 
The process of mining data regarding targeted organizations as well as reaching 
specific users employed in targeted organizations revealed several obstacles. These 
complicated processes contain several sub-processes including crawling the targeted 
organization’s OSN, creating fabricated profiles for the identity of our socialbots, and 
finally reaching specific employees of the organizations. Each of these tasks presented 
challenges. The operators of OSNs should consider the challenges associated with 
these processes and work on preventing them. 
 
3.4.1. Adjusting the Crawling Process 
The crawling phase is a fundamental step in the general processes. This phase 
includes several sequential actions: First, we had to select an organization as a target. 
The selected organization could be any organization or company with employees who 
use the Facebook or Xing OSNs. On Xing, it is much easier to find employees by a 
given organization because it is designated for professionals, who in most cases, 
display their workplace’s name. We could also make use of existing pages that were 
created and operated by organizations in order to present themselves and display their 
activities publicly. In many cases, these pages included minimal information (for 
example, a small list of employees), that served as an information source for the 
crawling process. 
 
After we chose our targeted organizations, we had to create a passive socialbot to 
initiate crawling on the OSNs. With these public accounts, we did not try to reach 
other employees, but rather to crawl on the OSNs and find user profiles that fit the 
given criteria. These accounts did not include social properties except for a name and 
an image of an animal of some kind. Moreover, they did not send any friend requests 
to anyone. 
 
When we finished creating a passive socialbot account, and after we had already 
chosen a targeted organization, we had to connect to Facebook or Xing with this 
created passive socialbot account and operate the crawler. As the crawler ran, it 
provided us with the profiles as text or HTML files, and also provided a list of 
connections between the users. The full implementation is described by Fire et al. 
[11]. 
 
In the described procedure, the crawler was able to collect between hundreds and 
thousands of OSN user profiles who defined themselves as employees in the given 
targeted organization within a few days, depending on the targeted organization and 
its size. Actually, we could have gained many more user profiles, but we added time-
outs and delays for slowing the crawler’s actions: a timeout of 0.5 – 1 minute for 
downloading profile, and a delay of 8 hours between crawling processes. It is not 
recommended to download a large amount of profiles over a short time. The OSN 
providers may identify the abnormal behavior of the crawler as malicious because it is 
uncommon for a user to surf hundreds of profiles so rapidly. One more option would 
be that if a great number of users would behave like the crawler, it would hurt the 
performance of the OSN server. Arousing the suspicion of the OSN providers could 
result in blocking the passive socialbots for crawling.  
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3.4.2.  Creating Realistic Socialbot Profiles 
The process of creating socialbot accounts within Facebook and Xing was largely 
done manually. The challenge faced at this stage was to avoid suspicion and to appear 
as a regular OSN user; otherwise our socialbots’ friend requests would have failed. In 
order to prevent failure, we chose common names for our socialbot accounts with the 
intent of looking familiar to other users. Then, we had to select images for socialbots’ 
profiles. 
 
In contrast to Boshmaf et al. [1], for female users on Facebook we selected obscure 
images of real women, such as images without a face, in order to make recognition 
unfeasible. For male users, we chose images of puppies, fancy cars, etc. 
 
To look like an authentic user, we added interests and other properties for each 
socialbot. The properties were “likes” to popular singers and movies, posting high 
quality nature images, adding posts to the user’s timeline, etc. 
 
We based the selection of profile images for our Xing socialbots on a unique profile 
image which included a suit and a tie in order to look like a professional employee. 
The image was based on profile images of two or three real people, which we then 
combined to create a new image of a person who does not actually exist. 
 
3.4.3. Reaching Specific Employees 
In the next stage, our socialbots were to create new connections with fifty users. 
These users would be picked randomly; however, each chosen user should have more 
than a thousand friends. Eventually, this stage passed without any specific problems 
on Facebook. Users with more than a thousand friends tended to accept strangers’ 
friendship requests, and the high percentage of friends we gained helped our 
Facebook socialbots look like real users to other potential friends. However, because 
of the small size of the Xing OSN compared to Facebook, it was hard for us to find 
fifty random users, who had more than a thousand connections. In order to overcome 
this obstacle, we reduced the threshold of the number of friends a potential user 
needed from a thousand to four hundred on Xing.  
 
Moreover, one of the parameters that can be used to detect suspicious activity is the 
community structure of users [60]. Therefore, socialbots are allowed to send friend 
requests to users only in a limited number of such communities. OSN providers use 
algorithms for detecting anomalies in a suspicious account’s network topology. 
According to Bosmaf et al. [1], users who connect randomly with strangers may 
actually be fake profiles. Hence, most of the legitimate users are connected only to a 
small number of communities. Fake profiles, on the other hand, tend to establish 
friendships with users from a large number of different communities [65]. In order to 
overcome these obstacles, we sent few friend requests in the beginning of the process 
to users who had a large number of friends. After a “friendly user” accepted the 
socialbot’s friend request, our next friend requests were sent to mutual friends of the 
“friendly user”—who also had a large number of friends. 
 
Afterwards, in the next phase we had to face numerous challenges. The second phase 
involved sending friend requests to mutual friends of a targeted user in the targeted 
organization. In this phase, a socialbot may be blocked or disabled by the OSN. The 
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process of disabling users is based on the amount of users that accept (or decline) a 
socialbot’s friend requests. A low acceptance percentage on Facebook, as well as on 
Xing, can trigger the OSN’s anomaly detection mechanism. As a result, a socialbot 
can get a warning regarding misuse suspicion, i.e., the OSN provider may accuse a 
socialbot of not knowing the specific user to whom he or she sent a friend request. 
Moreover, in exceptional cases, Facebook providers may send a message indicating 
that they have decided to halt the friend request in order to prevent misuse. If a 
socialbot continues to send friend requests while a low rate of acceptance persists, 
Facebook may then block this socialbot. Once blocked, Facebook requires a socialbot 
to provide a real phone number to verify its identity in order to avoid being disabled 
or losing access to Facebook. 
 
Furthermore, Facebook provides different defense mechanisms like checking the IP 
address of the logged-in user, facial recognition, and so on. We had to take these 
matters into account while conducting our study, in the interest of not disturbing the 
regulatory activity of the OSN and not to bias the study as well.  
 
On Xing, we did not receive warnings prior to being blocked. In the case of blocking 
a user, a user logs on to Xing and simply receives a message that the account has been 
deactivated. In some cases, our socialbots were blocked by Xing providers probably 
as a measure of protection. Xing providers count the number of unconfirmed users, 
i.e., users who did not confirm a specific user. When the count reaches one hundred 
unconfirmed users, Xing prevents the user from sending any additional friend 
requests. In order to overcome this obstacle we made an earnest attempt to perform 
the minimum amount of activities possible on Xing.  
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4. Results 
Two experiments were conducted in this research. One experiment tested Algorithm 1 
(see Section 3.2.1), whereas the second experiment tested Algorithm 2 (see Section 
3.2.2). The following results are presented in the following two sections.  
 
4.1. The Mining of Data of a Targeted Organization15  
We used three active socialbots on Facebook for mining information from three 
different organizations. First, the socialbot named 𝑆𝐹1 for reaching the 𝑂𝐹1 
organization, the second socialbot named 𝑆𝐹2 for reaching the 𝑂𝐹2 organization, and 
finally, the socialbot named 𝑆𝐹3 for reaching the 𝑂𝐹3 organization. Moreover, we 
operated a passive socialbot account, referred to as P. P was a public Facebook user 
account without friends. We used P only for crawling as an anchor point. P had no 
friends, so crawling with P was able to provide publicly available data. 
 
After we finished the crawling process using P, we utilized the 𝑆𝐹1, 𝑆𝐹2 and 𝑆𝐹3 active 
socialbots for reaching the 𝑂𝐹1, 𝑂𝐹2, and 𝑂𝐹3 organizations, respectively, using the 
techniques described in Algorithm 1 (see Section 3.2.1). The intrusion process by our 
socialbots was completed successfully when we crawled again on the targeted 
organizations, but this time with 𝑆𝐹1, 𝑆𝐹2 and 𝑆𝐹3 instead of P. As we can observe in 
Table 3, the 𝑆𝐹1, 𝑆𝐹2, and 𝑆𝐹3 socialbots gained 142 mutual friends of the targeted 
users in the targeted organizations so they were able to uncover more hidden 
connections and users in the targeted organizations.   
 
In the first process, 𝑆𝐹1 was able to gain 57 Facebook users who declared in their 
profile that they were currently 𝑂𝐹1 employees or past 𝑂𝐹1 employees. Overall,  𝑆𝐹1 
sent 126 friend requests to 126 different 𝑂𝐹1 employees and the rate of acceptance 
was 45.24% (see Table 3a, and Figure 5). 𝑆𝐹2 gained 60 𝑂𝐹2 employees, while 𝑆𝐹2 
sent 107 friend requests to 𝑂𝐹2 employees, which indicates a rate of acceptance of 
56.07% (see Table 3b, and Figure 5). As opposed to  𝑆𝐹1 and 𝑆𝐹2, 𝑆𝐹3 achieved 25 
𝑂𝐹3 employees that became its friends. 𝑆𝐹3 sent 56 friend requests to 56 different 𝑂𝐹3 
employees and achieved a rate of acceptance of 44.64% (see Table 3c, and Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: Socialbots' user accumulation 
                                                           
15 The results shown in this section are also published in the paper “Organizational Intrusion: 
Organization Mining using Socialbots,” Section IV.   
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Next, we crawled with  𝑆𝐹1 on the 𝑂𝐹1 organization in order to uncover new 
employees and new connections that we did not find when we crawled with P.  
Finally, we identified 2,199 informal connections of 330 Facebook users who, 
according to their Facebook profiles, worked at the 𝑂𝐹1 organization (see Figure 6a).  
This means that 𝑆𝐹1 discovered 6.79% more employees, and 18.29% additional 
hidden connections (see Table 4). By crawling with 𝑆𝐹2, we were able to identify 
3,831 informal connections of the 469 𝑂𝐹2 employees (see Figure 6b).  
This indicates that 𝑆𝐹2 was able to uncover 13.56% more employees, and 8.34% more 
hidden links (see Table 4). Moreover, by crawling with 𝑆𝐹3, we detected 23,823 
informal connections of the 1,675 𝑂𝐹3 employees (see Figure 6c).  
This means that  𝑆𝐹3 detected 12.87% more employees, and 22.27% more hidden 
links (see Table 4). 
 
Moreover, using the MCL algorithm, 𝑆𝐹1was able to discover 34 clusters with an 
average size of 9.5 employees, and a maximal size of 159 employees (see Figure 7a).  
𝑆𝐹2 was able to discover 29 clusters with an average size of 15.828 employees, and a 
maximal size of 257 employees (see Figure 7b), and 𝑆𝐹3 was able to discover 163 
clusters with an average size of 9.632 employees, and a maximal size of 296 
employees (see Figure 7c).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Organizational social network crawled by active socialbot (red links represent newly discovered links, 
and red nodes represent newly discovered employees) 
(a) OF1 organization (b) OF2 organization (c) OF3 organization 
Figure 7: Clusters (after intrusion) 
(a) OF1 organization (b) OF2 organization (c) OF3 organization 
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Table 4: Intrusion summary 
 
4.2. Reaching Specific Users16 
In this section we present the results of Algorithm 2 based on the utilization of our 
suggested algorithms. The following results are categorized by the OSNs used as well 
as by the active socialbots. Please notice that accepted users are defined as mutual 
friends of targeted users who accepted a socialbot’s friend request while rejected users 
                                                           
 16 The results shown in this section are also published in the paper“ Homing Socialbots :Intrusion on 
a specific organization’s employee using Socialbots ”,Section V ,and in  “ Guided Socialbots: Infiltrating 
the Social Networks of Specific Organizations ’Employees ”,Section 4  . 
(a) SF1 socialbot (b) SF2 socialbot 
(c) SF3 socialbot 
Table 3: Active socialbots’ users accumulation 
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are defined as mutual friends of the targeted users who rejected a socialbot’s friend 
requests.   
 
4.2.1. Facebook Results 
We used four active socialbots on Facebook in order to infiltrate targeted users in four 
different organizations. Our socialbots sent friend requests to targeted users’ mutual 
friends in order to gain as many mutual friends as possible to facilitate acceptance by 
the targeted users. We present the results we received from the 𝑆𝐹4, 𝑆𝐹5, and  𝑆𝐹6  
socialbots that attempted to infiltrate specific employees in the targeted organizations, 
𝑂𝐹4, 𝑂𝐹5, and  𝑂𝐹6, respectively (see Table 5). The FIS disabled the  𝑆𝐹7 socialbot, 
which was intended to infiltrate organization 𝑂𝐹7. 
 
 
Facebook 
Socialbots 
Mutual 
Friends 
Targeted 
Users 
Accepted/Total Accepted/Total 
𝑺𝑭𝟒 46/124 5/10 
𝑺𝑭𝟓 38/114 7/10 
𝑺𝑭𝟔 87/219 4/10 
Table 5: Facebook socialbots’ total results 
4.2.1.1. 𝑺𝑭𝟒 Socialbot     
By the end of the reaching process, SF1 sent 124 friend requests to 124 users in the 
𝑂𝐹4 organization, including the ten targeted users. Among them, 46 users accepted, 
and 78 users rejected 𝑆𝐹4’s requests (see Figure 9a and 10a). 
First, we randomly chose ten users who stated on their Facebook profiles that they 
work or had worked in the 𝑂𝐹4  organization. We then collected the friends of the ten 
targeted users who also worked in the 𝑂𝐹4 organization and sent them friend requests. 
Next, socialbot 𝑆𝐹4 sent friend requests to the ten targeted users (TU1- TU10). In total, 
socialbot  𝑆𝐹4 sent 124 friend requests and was successful in connecting with 46 
different users (see Table 5).  
With regard to the targeted users, 𝑆𝐹4 was able to become friends with five targeted 
users (TU1, TU5, TU6, TU8, and TU10), making for a success rate of 50% (see Table 
6, and Figure 11a).  
Moreover, 𝑆𝐹4 was able to become friends with 37.09% of all users who received its 
friend requests (see Table 6). 
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Table 6: OF4 targeted users summary results 
 
4.2.1.2. 𝑺𝑭𝟓 Socialbot 
𝑆𝐹5 sent 114 friend requests to 114 users in the OF2 organization, including the ten 
targeted users. Among them, 38 users accepted, and 76 users rejected 𝑆𝐹5’s requests 
(see Figure 9b, and 10b). 
Regarding the targeted users, socialbot 𝑆𝐹5 was able to become friends with seven 
targeted users (TU1,TU2, TU3, TU5, TU7, TU9, and TU10), with a success rate of 70% 
(see Table 7 and Figure 11b).  
Moreover, 𝑆𝐹5 was able to become a friend of 33.33% of all the users who received 
friend requests (see Table 7). 
 
 
 
Table 7: OF5 targeted users summary results 
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4.2.1.3. 𝑺𝑭𝟔 Socialbot 
First, in order to seem like a real user 𝑆𝐹6 sent 58 friend requests to random users with 
more than a thousand friends. Among them, 33 users accepted its friend requests, and 
19 users asked 𝑆𝐹6 to be their friend. This means that 𝑆𝐹6 reached the threshold of 
fifty users in the first three days (see Figure 8).  
 
 
Figure 8: SF6's random user accumulation 
 
Overall, 𝑆𝐹6 accumulated 129 random users as friends and achieved an acceptance 
rate of 56.9% (see Table 8). 
By the end of the reaching process, 𝑆𝐹6 sent 219 friend requests to 219 users in the 
𝑂𝐹6 organization, including the ten targeted users. Among them, 88 users accepted, 
and 131 users rejected 𝑆𝐹6’s requests (see Figure 9c, and 10c). 
Regarding the targeted users, 𝑆𝐹6 was able to become friends with 4 targeted users 
(TU2, TU3, TU8, and TU10) with a success rate of 40% (see Table 9, and Figure 11c).  
Moreover, 𝑆𝐹6 was able to become friends with 40.18% of all the users who received 
friend requests in the infiltration process (see Table 5). 
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Table 8: SF6's random users accumulation summary results 
 
Table 9: OF6 targeted users summary results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Organizational social network - Red nodes represent targeted users and orange nodes represent users who 
received friend requests. 
 
(a) OF4 organization (b) OF5 organization (c) OF6 organization 
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Figure 10: Organizational social network – Green nodes represent accepted users who accepted a friend request from a 
socialbot, red nodes represent rejected users who did not accept a friend request from a socialbot, yellow nodes 
represent targeted users who accepted, and black nodes represent targeted users who rejected. 
 
Figure 11: Organizations’ targeted users - The numbers represent how many mutual friends the given socialbot had before it sent a friend 
request to the targeted users. A blue column represents a targeted user who accepted the socialbot whereas a red column represents a 
targeted user who rejected the friend request. 
 
(a) OF4 organization (b) OF5 organization (c) OF6 organization 
(a) OF4 organization (b) OF5 organization 
(c) OF6 organization 
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4.2.2. Xing Results 
We used five socialbots on Xing for specific user infiltration of five different 
organizations. To achieve these goals, our socialbots sent friend requests to targeted 
users’ mutual friends in order to gain as many mutual friends as possible to help gain 
acceptance by the targeted users. In total, our Xing active socialbots sent 850 friend 
requests to 850 Xing users. Among them, 439 accepted our socialbots’ friend requests 
(51.64% acceptance rate). We present the results obtained from the Xing socialbots, 
Sx1, Sx2, and Sx3, which attempted to infiltrate specific employees in the targeted 
organizations, Ox1, Ox2, and Ox3, respectively (see Table 10). Unfortunately, Sx3 was 
blocked prior to completion of the infiltration process so we did not present statistics 
pertaining to it in Table 10. Moreover, the other two active socialbots, Sx4 and Sx5, 
were blocked by Xing so we present only the results obtained from the accumulation 
of the random users process (see Section 4.2.2.4, and 4.2.2.5). 
 
  
Table 10: Xing socialbots summary results 
4.2.2.1. 𝐒𝐗𝟏 Socialbot 
 
First, Sx1 sent 101 friend requests to random users with more than 400 friends. 
Among them, 68 users accepted Sx1’s friend requests, resulting in an acceptance rate 
of 67.33% in six days (see Table 11, and Figure 12).  
 
 
Table 11: SX1 random users summary results 
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Figure 12: Xing socialbots random users accumulation 
By the end of the infiltration process, Sx1 sent 71 friend requests to 71 users in the Ox1 
organization, including the ten targeted users. Among them, only ten users accepted 
(14.08%), and 61 users rejected Sx1’s requests (see Figures 13a, and 14a). 
With regard to targeted users, Sx1 was able to become friends with two targeted users 
(TU2, and TU5), with a success rate of 20% (see Table 12, and Figure 15a).  
Moreover, Sx1 was able to become a friend of 14.08% of all users who received friend 
requests (see Table 12). 
 
 
 
Table 12: OX1 targeted users summary results 
 
4.2.2.2. 𝐒𝐗𝟐 Socialbot 
Sx2 sent 87 friend requests to random users with more than 400 friends. Among them, 
71 users accepted Sx2’s friend requests, generating an acceptance rate of 81.61% in 
five days (see Table 13). 
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Table 13: SX2 random users summary results 
By the end of the infiltration process, Sx2 sent 241 friend requests to 241 users in the 
Ox2 organization (including the ten targeted users). Among them, 123 users accepted, 
and 118 users rejected Sx2’s requests (see Figure 13b, and 14b). 
With regard to targeted users, Sx2 was able to become a friend of six targeted users 
(TU3, TU4, TU6, TU7, TU8, and TU10) with a success rate of 60% (see Table 14, and  
Figure 15b). Moreover, Sx2 was able to become a friend of 51.04% of all users who 
received friend requests (see Table 14). 
 
 
Table 14: OX2 targeted users summary results 
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Figure 13: Organizational social network - Red nodes represent targeted users and orange nodes represent users who 
received friend requests. 
 
Figure 14: Organizational social network – Green nodes represent accepted users who accepted a friend request from a 
socialbot, red nodes represent rejected users who did not accept friend request, yellow nodes represent targeted users 
who accepted, and black nodes represent targeted users who rejected. 
Figure 15: Organizations’ targeted users - The numbers represent how many mutual friends the given socialbot had before it 
sent a friend request to the targeted users. A blue column represents a targeted user who accepted the socialbot whereas a 
red column represents a targeted user who rejected the friend request. 
 
(a) OX1 organization (b) OX2 organization 
(a) OX1 organization (b) OX2 organization 
(a) OX1 organization (b) OX2 organization 
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4.2.2.3. 𝐒𝐗𝟑 Socialbot 
 
In order to seem as if it were an actual user, Sx3 sent 90 friend requests to random 
users with more than 400 friends. Among them, 59 users accepted Sx3’s friend 
requests, creating an acceptance rate of 65.56% in five days (see Table 15). 
 
 
Table 15: SX3 random users summary results 
 
By the end of the infiltration process, Sx3 had sent 85 friend requests to 85 users in the 
Ox3 organization before it was blocked by Xing. Among the users who received friend 
requests, 22 users accepted and 63 users rejected them—making for an acceptance 
rate of 25.88% in five days (see Table 16). 
 
 
Table 16: OX3 targeted users summary results 
 
4.2.2.4. 𝐒𝐗𝟒 Socialbot 
 
Sx4 did not manage to reach the threshold of fifty friends when sending friend 
requests to random users with more than 400 friends (see Figure 12), as in the middle 
of the process it was blocked by Xing. Sx4 did manage to send 75 friend requests to 
random users with more than 400 friends before it was blocked. Among them, 41 
users accepted Sx4’s friend requests—producing an acceptance rate of 54.67% in four 
days (see Table 17). 
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Table 17: SX4 random users summary results 
 
4.2.2.5. 𝐒𝐗𝟓 Socialbot 
Sx5 was not able to reach the threshold of 50 friends when sending requests to users 
with more than 400 friends (see Figure 12). As was the case with Sx5, in the middle of 
the infiltration process, Sx5 was blocked by Xing. Sx5 managed to send 100 friend 
requests to random users before it was blocked, and 45 users accepted Sx5’s friend 
requests. This made for an acceptance rate of 45% in six days (see Table 18). 
 
 
Table 18: SX5 random users summary results 
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5. Ethical Considerations 
Today, most OSNs do not allow free access to personal information due to the privacy 
concerns of network users and the OSN’s terms of use [77]. As a result, much of the 
research using OSNs involves various techniques of collecting sensitive data by 
circumventing OSN limitations. Elovici et al. [77] performed a comprehensive review 
of research involving OSNs. They described two kinds of OSN research: “Whitehat” 
research that is defined as legitimate academic and industrial investigation, and 
“Blackhat/greyhat” research that is defined as studying and exploiting vulnerabilities 
of OSNs in order to extract sensitive information, actively connect to users, create 
fake identities, and even perform malicious activities. The actions that researchers 
have to do in order to get this kind of data are controversial and raise many ethical 
questions. 
 
In order to perform accurate blackhat/greyhat research, a researcher must base his or 
her study on actual OSN data, such as real connections between users, correct textual 
content, authentic files, etc. Researchers must monitor many real-life OSN users in 
order to study the diffusion of data in OSNs. An effective and widely employed 
technique to obtain data from OSNs and their users is based on establishing 
connections with users, typically by creating a large number of fake OSN user 
accounts, which are then used to connect other users. 
 
Moreover, Elovici et al. claimed that the main goal of academic blackhat/greyhat 
research is done with a precise purpose: to study vulnerabilities in order to create 
improved defenses for OSNs and their users. 
 
Given the very nature of OSNs, we should ask the following question: Is it ethical to 
perform research such as ours? We believe that the answer to this question is 
affirmative for several reasons. 
 
First, during the period that we conducted this study, Ben-Gurion University of the 
Negev, did not question our work or require approval by the research ethics 
committee in order to conduct the study. Furthermore, we made a great effort in order 
to increase the standard of ethics in the domain of OSNs [10], [77], [78]. 
 
Second, in the initial crawling process of our study on Facebook and Xing, we 
collected only publicly available data that was accessible to every registered user. 
 
Third, we avoided using profile images of real users when creating the identities of 
our socialbots. Instead, we selected profile images that either did not include users’ 
faces or that presented the faces in such a way that it was impossible to identify the 
person, or we Photoshopped images of fictional entities. 
 
Fourth, although this study included actual OSN users, and the results may 
inadvertently provide knowledge of concern to OSN users and operators, ignoring the 
problem does not provide a solution. We can rid ourselves of responsibility for these 
challenging situations and choose not to perform such research, however, the problem 
will continue to exist and in fact, increase. Performing this type of research aids the 
development of new forms of protection provided by OSNs. 
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Lastly, given the enormous number of OSN users and the extensive opportunities to 
exploit the personal information of each and every one of them, it is crucial to study 
the dangers and privacy issues that exist for users of OSNs. As was previously 
mentioned, Facebook itself has estimated that 8.7% of its accounts are defined as fake 
[45], and certainly some percentage of these are malicious. OSN users need to be 
aware of the online dangers that exist and modify their actions accordingly. Online 
security represents an acute problem that must be studied by legitimate researchers in 
order to be effectively addressed by industry and the academia. 
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6. Discussion 
Using the methods described in Section 3.2, our socialbots were able to reach specific 
employees in three different targeted organizations within the Facebook OSN and two 
targeted organizations within the Xing OSN. However, we should extend our 
discussion beyond these successful infiltrations. 
 
First, there are points of comparison between the socialbots that completed the 
reaching process successfully and the ones that were exposed and eventually blocked 
by the OSNs. In total, we operated four socialbots on Facebook. Three of four 
socialbots completed this process. SF4, SF5, and SF6 achieved success rates of 50%, 
70%, and 40% respectively (see Table 5). Socialbot SF7 conversely, was blocked by 
Facebook operators in the middle of the process. We believe that the failure of SF7 
lies in the location feature: namely, the fact that there was a great geographic distance 
between the targeted organization OF7 and SF7 socialbot’s current location attribute. 
The air travel distance between the location of most of the OF7 organization 
employees and SF7’s current location was more than 4,000 kilometers, spanning 
several countries. It is important to note that the difference between the targeted 
organization’s employees and the socialbot’s current location existed only in the case 
of OF7; in all other cases, the location of the socialbot was similar to the location of 
the targeted organization. We can assume from this incident that there were likely 
cultural differences—which logically correspond to geographic distance—between 
OSN users, and such differences could raise suspicions when contemplating whether 
to accept friend requests. We hope to verify this assumption in a future study. 
Therefore, we decided to tailor the socialbot’s identity to its target. Moreover, this 
incident reinforces the conclusion of Liben-Nowell et al. [79] regarding their finding 
of a strong correlation between friendship and geographic location on LiveJournal.18 
 
With regard to our infiltration of Xing, we operated five socialbots. Among them, two 
of the five completed the reaching process. SX1, and SX2 succeeded in reaching 
specific employees; however, SX3, SX4, and SX5 failed in their respective missions (see 
Sections 4.2.2.3, 4.2.2.4, and 4.2.2.5). We believe that the failure in these three cases 
resulted from the socialbot’s organizational affiliation. Our successful socialbots, SX1 
and SX2, were defined as users who were not connected directly to the targeted 
organizations: SX1 was defined as a freelancer coach, whereas SX2 was defined as a 
recruiter in a technology-oriented organization. They were able to infiltrate specific 
employees in the targeted organization with the success rate of 20% and 60% (see 
Table 10). In contrast to these two socialbots, we defined SX3 as an employee within 
the OX3 organization. SX3 succeeded in passing the first stage, the accumulation of 
fifty random users (see Table 15), but once SX3 began initiating friend requests to 
employees of OX3, suspicions arose. Several suspicious users accessed their 
organization’s human resource software to verify SX3’s false identity. Some of them 
even notified the socialbot that they knew for sure that the identity was not an 
employee in their organization. A few days later, the SX3 socialbot was blocked by 
Xing. These actions taken by the employees using organizational software tools for 
recognition, prior to accepting a friend request demonstrates how a well-formed 
policy and clear instructions to employees can benefit the security of employees and 
their organizations on OSNs. 
                                                           
18 http://www.livejournal.com 
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The socialbots SX4 and SX5 failed in the middle phase of the accumulation of fifty 
random users (see Tables 17, and 18). We defined these two socialbots as employees 
in two random organizations. It is important to mention that these two random 
organizations were not the targeted organizations that we wanted to infiltrate, but 
separate organizations we had chosen for the identity of the socialbots. While trying 
to evade detection by Xing operators based on the community’s structure of OSN 
users (see Section 3.4.3), our socialbot’s friend requests became too embedded within 
the random organizations: Among the 75 friend requests that were sent by SX4, 28 
users were employees in the randomly chosen organization (37%). Similarly, among 
100 friend requests that were sent by SX5, 58 users were employees in the randomly 
chosen organization (58%). SX4 and SX5 were blocked by Xing operators when 
employees from these organizations verified the identities of these two socialbots. 
 
Another issue we wish to discuss is the low infiltration of Xing socialbot SX1, which 
was able to infiltrate only 20% of the targeted users (see Tables 10 and 12). We 
believe that this poor performance was related to the fact of the 61 users who did not 
respond to SX1’s friend requests, there were 25 users who had 0% activity. This means 
that 41% of the users who did not respond to SX1’s friend requests were inactive, i.e, 
users who did not actually receive the friend requests. It is important to understand 
that we made a point not to avoid these zero-activity users in our study; we sent friend 
requests to users who had 0% activity regardless, in order to fairly evaluate their role. 
 
Lastly, we want to consider the recommended threshold of the number of mutual 
friends that would influence a specific user to accept our socialbot’s friend request. 
Our previous study [13] found that a socialbot would typically be accepted as a friend 
of specific employees when it had gained seven or more mutual friends of the targeted 
user. This number of mutual friends corresponds to the results illustrated in Figures 
11a and 11b. However, when expanding the study to include one more organization 
on Facebook (see Figure 11c) and two organizations on Xing (see Figures 15a and 
15b), we can suggest that the threshold has increased to 17 or more mutual friends, 
and the probability that a targeted user will accept our socialbot’s request is 70%. 
There were 7 targeted users with 17 or more mutual friends who accepted our 
socialbots’ friend requests: one targeted user from OF4, two targeted users from OF6, 
and four targeted users from OX2. There were three targeted users with 17 or more 
mutual friends who rejected our socialbots’ friend requests: two targeted users from 
OF6, and one targeted user from OX2. These suggestions are further reinforced by the 
conclusions of Boshmaf et al. [1] that the more a user’s mutual friends accept the 
socialbot’s requests, the more likely the targeted user is to accept the socialbot’s 
friend request as well. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this thesis, we demonstrated two attacks by socialbots. First, we demonstrated how 
adversaries may use socialbots for mining data regarding targeted organizations. 
Second, we demonstrated how adversaries may reach specific employees in targeted 
organizations within OSNs. This further emphasizes the persistent privacy issues 
surrounding OSNs. Based on our results, we can draw the following conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
First, with regard to the data mining of targeted organizations our proposed method 
was perceived as a great success. By accepting the socialbots’ friend requests, we 
were able to expose more information, such as hidden employees, connections 
between employees, and groups, in comparison with the public information we 
gathered with the passive socialbot P. With regard to hidden employees, SF1 found 
330 employees compared with P which found 309 employees, SF2 found 469 
employees compared with P which found 413 employees, and SF3 found 1,675 
employees compared with P which found 1,484 employees. Regarding hidden 
connections, SF1 found 2,199 links compared with P which found 1,859 links, SF2 
found 3,831 links compared with P which found 3,536 links, and SF3 found 23,823 
links compared with P which found 19,484 links (see Table 4).     
 
Moreover, we were able to expose a different number of clusters with our socialbots: 
34 clusters were found by SF1 - compared to 35 clusters found by P, 29 clusters were 
found by  SF2  compared with 19 clusters found by P, and 163 clusters were found by  
SF3  compared with 141 clusters found by P (see Table 4). However by using other 
measures, like the closeness centrality measure, we received the same number of 
clusters with both the passive and the active socialbots. Finally, we can conclude that 
using our active socialbots, we succeeded in discovering up to 13.55% more 
employees and up to 23.304% more informal organizational links when compared to 
the organizations’ social network collected by the passive socialbots (see Table 4). 
Our results demonstrate that organizations that are interested in protecting themselves 
should instruct their employees not to disclose information on social networks and to 
be careful when accepting friend requests. 
 
Second, we were able to show that OSN users still tend to accept friend requests from 
complete strangers. Most of our socialbots on both OSNs were able to reach the 
threshold of fifty random users within 5-6 days (see Figures 5, 8, and 12). OSN users 
should realize how easy it is for an attacker to create socialbots, and how insignificant 
it is to attackers when their socialbots are blocked. In the case that a socialbot is 
blocked, the attacker can quickly create a new, improved fake profile and continue 
with the infiltration process. OSN users must understand the risks of accepting a 
friend request from people they do not know and should ignore friend requests 
received from strangers. 
 
Third, our experimental results from the process of reaching specific employees 
indicate that there is a link between having mutual friends and the acceptance of 
friend requests. The step of first being accepted as a friend of a mutual friend of the 
targeted users in targeted organizations was significant to our socialbots’ ability to 
infiltrate. Without this step, we believe that the acceptance rate would have been 
much lower. Moreover, we found that if a socialbot had 17 or more mutual friends of 
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the targeted user, the probability that the targeted user would accept the socialbot’s 
friend request was 70% (see Section 6). 
 
Fourth, malicious socialbots operate within OSNs and can function at a high level of 
sophistication. As we learned from executing our suggested algorithm, most of our 
socialbots were able to infiltrate specific employees in targeted organizations on both 
Facebook and Xing, despite the differences between these two OSNs. Please note that 
we intend to further explore cases of socialbot blocking in a future study. 
Furthermore, our results of the SF7 socialbot may indicate that users tend to trust 
strangers on the basis of their mutual attributes like current location, mutual friends, 
etc (see Section 6). We recommend that users not rely upon these mutual features 
when a stranger sends them a friend request. 
 
Fifth, organizations should understand the risks of organizational information leakage 
that might occur due to their employees using OSNs. Moreover, we strongly 
recommend that organizations should take responsibility for raising the level of 
awareness of employees to this problematic phenomenon and for underscoring the 
risks posed to employees when they accept unfamiliar users as friends. Organizations 
should explain to OSN users the risks of data leakage and provide them with tools to 
verify users who declare themselves to be employees in the organizations. This kind 
of software could help employees verify whether or not a stranger who sends them a 
friend request is a real employee. This recommendation also endorses a 
recommendation by Fire et al. [10] that suggested performing a short security check 
on a stranger. 
 
This study has several future research directions. One possible direction is more 
thorough testing of the conclusions we found regarding the cultural differences 
between users and organizational affiliation of socialbots when we define their 
identity. Another possible direction is to use the algorithm for reaching specific users 
to investigate whether our results are consistent over time and to assess whether there 
are changes in users’ awareness and responses to privacy issues. Moreover, we can 
use the algorithm on other OSNs and observe the differences between them. 
Furthermore, we could differentiate between female and male profiles when reaching 
OSN users to investigate any gender differences that exist. 
 
In both the present and the future, individuals and organizations need to be aware that 
harmful socialbots exist on OSNs. Consequently, users must access social networks 
wisely and should establish effective security and privacy measures. 
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 תקציר
 
בשנים האחרונות הרשתות חברתיות פופולריות מאוד. הן הפכו לחלק אינטגרלי וחיוני ביומיום 
שלנו. משתמשים מכל קצוות תבל משקיעים חלק נכבד מזמנם בגלישה לרשתות חברתיות 
המאפשרות להם ליצור קשרים חדשים עם משתמשים אחרים על בסיס אינטרסים משותפים, 
 כמו גם חיזוק קשרים מן העבר.  פעילויות משותפות, ורעיונות
לצד האספקטים החיוביים של הרשתות החברתיות משתמשים נאלצים להתמודד מול בעיות 
ייחודיות. אחת המרכזיות בהן היא פרטיות ואבטחה. פריצות אבטחה לעיתים קרובות מתרחשות 
עבודתם כאשר משתמשים כותבים, משתפים ומפרסמים מידע פרטי לגבי עצמם, חבריהם ומקום 
ברשתות החברתיות. לצערנו, לעיתים המידע אותו הם מפרסמים לציבור עלול להיות מנוצל ע"י 
גורמים זדונייםשיש להם אינטרס להרע. מידע פרטי נפוץ יכול להכיל תמונות, תאריך לידה, 
 השתייכות דתית, עניינים אישיים, דעות פוליטיות ועוד.
האקוטיות הטבועות ברשתות חברתיות החושפות את  במחקר זה אנו מנסים להדגיש את הבעיות
העובדים כמו גם את הארגונים להתקפות סייבר. במקרים רבים התקפות אלו כוללות שימוש 
בבוטים חברתיים שיכולים להפיץ ספאם ונוזקות, שימוש בפישינג וכ"ו. ההתקפות הזדוניות הללו 
 נכסים אינטלקטואלים ומידע עסקי סודי. עלולות להסתיים בגניבת זהויות, הונאות, והפסדים של 
הן אלו שהיוו את ה"דלק"  חברתיות רשתותב הקשורות החמורותוהאבטחה  פרטיותה בעיות
לשני המחקרים המשלימים הכלולים בתזה זו. במחקר הראשון אנו מפתחים אלגוריתם כללי 
פופולריות ביותר לכריית נתונים מארגוני מטרה תוך שימוש בפייסבוק (כרגע הרשת החברתית ה
בעולם) ובוטים חברתיים. באמצעות יצירת חברויות עם עובדים בארגוני מטרה הבוטים שלנו 
הצליחו לשחזר את המבנה הארגוני של ארגוני המטרה כמו גם לזהות קשרים חבויים ועובדים 
ו את נוספים שלא היינו מסוגלים למצוא באמצעות קרולינג עם בוטים חברתיים פסיביים. אנו בחנ
השיטה המוצעת ברשת החברתית של פייסבוק והיינו מסוגלים לבנות את הרשת החברתית של 
העובדים בשלושה ארגונים אמיתיים שונים. בנוסף לכך, בתהליך הקרולינג עם הבוטים 
יותר קשרים  %72.22יותר עובדים ועד  %55.31החברתיים האקטיביים שלנו הצלחנו לגלות עד 
ארגון לעומת תהליך הקרולינג שבוצע על ידי הבוטים הפסיביים קשרים נסתרים בין עובדי ה
 חברים מכל סוג שהוא.
במחקר השני אנו פיתחנו אלגוריתם כללי להשגת משתמשים ספציפיים ברשתות חברתיות 
שהגדירו את עצמם כעובדים בארגוני המטרה תוך שימוש בטופולוגיות של הרשתות החברתיות 
חברתיים. אנו בחנו את השיטה המוצעת על משתמשי מטרה משלושה ארגונים בארגון ובבוטים 
אמיתים שונים בפייסבוק ושני ארגונים אמיתיים ברשת החברתית זינג (רשת חברתית גרמנית 
פופולרית נוספת). בסופו של דבר, הבוטים שלנו היו מסוגלים להתחבר עם משתמשים ספציפיים 
 בזינג. %06בוק ועד בפייס %07עם אחוזי הצלחה של עד 
התוצאות שהושגו בשני המחקרים מדגישות את הסכנות הטמונות ברשתות חברתיות. אנו 
מאמינים שהעלאת המודעות ביחס לנושאי פרטיות בקרב כל הישויות ברשתות החברתיות: 
משתמשים, ארגונים ומפעילי הרשתות כמו גם פיתוח כלים מניעתיים ופיתוח מדינויות אבטחה 
יכולים לסייע במציאת פתרון בר קיימא עבור המצב הקריטי הקיים במרחב הרשתות נוקשות 
החברתיות תוך מתן הגנה טובה יותר למשתמשי הרשתות החברתיות מבחינה פרטיות 
        ואבטחה.   
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